Sustainable Future: Possible Reality or Political Myth

We may start by questioning, if at all, sustainability is a desirable goal by and for the humanity. In other words, do we really want that our process of development should have a sustainable face? In course of the paper, I would endeavour to show why this question is relevant and of importance for us to address. In these two days, I am sure you all have heard many learned speakers with their considered opinion and plea for sustainable development. Clearly, this presentation does not dispute the fact that sustainable development is the only path ahead for our survival. However, if we take out a minute from the hustle and bustle of daily life and think as to why we require such a seminar or number of seminars, then we will realize it is not for allocated resource utilization at the end of the financial year that motivates us to do so. The issue of sustainability is mired in controversy and orientations that are selfishly wasteful, therefore requires critical analysis and awareness.

For the present purpose, we can say that sustainable development is a process that fulfills the requirements of the present generation by not jeopardizing the ability and survival of the future generations. We all know that we do not yet have an internationally agreed ‘objective indicators of sustainable development’ despite our professed desire to do so since the 1992 RIO Declaration. The issue at hand has two dimensions. On the one hand, it contains the issue of linkage between development and environment. On the other, it generates the issues of socio-culturally viable sustainability. It is agreed all over the world that sustainable development is possible by bolstering long term economic, social and environmental capital compounded by the ecological and human dimensions. This has resulted in the belief that sustainable development has the potential to promote tradeoffs and externalities in future. In the process, we witness emergence of new legal instruments, corpus of guidelines, best practices, and self-ordained code of conduct to regulate and manage use of natural resources. Yet the challenges to the process of sustainable development are far from getting weak. Rather they remain where they were.
A “global ecological crisis” is a crisis the causes of which are diffuse and the effects of which are universal. From the economic point of view, a global crisis is much different from local crises. In local crises, such as river-pollution, traffic jams, or soil erosion, local agents are usually directly accountable for damages to local victims (frequently the same individuals). By contrast, in the ecological global crisis, the “culprit” may be nothing less than a model of development encompassing whole continents, and “victims” may be in other continents with other styles of living. Clearly, globalization and its social effects have indirect local ecological effects, since poverty is in se a cause of worsening of environment, be it in ‘dharavi’ of Mumbai or in shanty-towns or in semi-arid over-worked countryside. However, we are here going to consider the way differentiated industrial strategies within globalization foster different attitudes towards global ecological crises and the issue of sustainable development. Let us take the case of greenhouse effect.
There was a partial consensus in the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC Report 1991) that, for a doubling of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere (or equivalent quantities of other Green House Gases), the rise in average temperature would be 3°C ± 1.5°C. This large uncertainty for a physicist is not so relevant for international relations: as a rise of + 1.5°C would itself be a major problem to tackle (and + 4.5° C an inconceivable crisis)! Uncertainty also exists on when such a concentration would be reached, but, at the present rate of emissions, it is agreed that it is a question of more or less half a century.
Regarding the effects of a + 3°C increase in average temperature, more imprecision prevail. Interestingly though, despite the fact that we are unaware exactly what the physical effects of this would be but every body realizes who would suffer more, and relatively be worse looser economically. Going by the predictions, the many parts of the world will get tropicalized, that is weather will be globally wetter, but water will be less useful on the ground, for it will evaporate faster, as well as will erode the soil more ferociously. Countries of the geographically and socially South of the world will get affected more because of this as these countries relying heavily on agriculture and with a large peasant population. Another aspect of the same phenomenon is that countries with large population in coastal regions are going to get affected due to the dilatation of the sea water will raise its level by 30-50 cm. Countries like Maldives, India, Bangladesh, and of Africa and South America will become victims of such changes.
By contrast, in the countries of the North, like USA, though being a powerful agricultural country, but with only one semi-desert delta, has a weak “interest” in fighting green-house effect. That is because a doubling of CO2 in last 50 years with a Green House Effect of + 3°C, its cost for a country like USA, will be very low (-0,25% in expected GDP). Not surprisingly, such a low cost justifies their orientation of few anti-Green House Gas actions. Therefore, instead of "unwise" regulation and reduction in emission, an ‘ecotax’ of $ 5 US per ton of carbon, that is 58 cents per barrel of oil, is found to be more “cost-effective”.
In view of the above, it is but natural to witness the Northern countries with a “Do Nothing” attitude whereas countries of the South normally should have “Do Something” attitude. The common belief in the arena of International Relations is that the South is trying to protect its climate against the Northern pollution by Green House Gas. And here lies the paradox in contradiction, the mystery in conflict, and the source of the political myth regarding sustainable development. We will see that interestingly there are actual similarities of attitudes in the Climate negotiation among the countries of North and South, and it very much contrasts with reality.
In terms of development and underdevelopment, countries can be broadly classified following Benhaim, Caron & Levarlet [1991] in to three categories linked to the energy system: type of energy used, indices of consumption of primary energy, of energy efficiency, of energy reserves, of CO2 emissions, per capita, per unit of GDP, per country.
1. Green House Gas efficient super-virtuous countries (like Swiss, Sweden, France because of nuclear power, then other Scandinavian countries, Canada, Belgium)
2. Green House Gas virtuous countries (like Japan and EEC)
3. Fossil energy waster countries (USA, Petro-monarchies of Middle East, former Socialist countries, South-Africa and China)
4. Countries with radical accusation strategy (like India, Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia)
The first group is both rich and GHG-efficient in the production of their energy. The second group of countries is ready to implement the precaution principle, i.e. they have or can get the technologies, and they are already at a relatively low (yet unsustainable) level of emissions. The third category of countries is the worst violators and follows blockage strategy. They believe that the more a country is developed, the more it consumes energy per capita and thus it emits more CO2. Very different in appearance are the countries in the fourth category. These countries are too poor to be already GHG-dangerous and to be GHG-efficient. Nevertheless, clearly they dream to be as "developed" as Western Countries, and consider that up to now these precursors never implemented any precaution principle. These countries are pushed into an accusation strategy: denouncing the responsibility of the North-West of the World in the past for the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere, such a strategy contends that it is not yet time to implement a precaution principle in Developing Countries.
The position of USA is clearly in favour of "doing nothing" : the dangers from greenhouse effects are weak, the cost of fighting it may be very high, even if the low GHG-efficiency of their energy-production makes the marginal improvements quite inexpensive. The problem is that, from a global sustainability point of view, the improvements required from USA are far from marginal. A "sustainable" GHG production is thought to be 500kg per capita and per year. USA produce 5 000kg.
The radical accusation strategy seems to be the opposite, and indeed its glamour in a North-South conflict is very attractive: “You are the culprits, you have to do everything”. The problem is that this position is a blockage position just as well, since it is subordinated to the implementation of a precaution strategy by foreign countries which are in favour of blockage. It is quite appealing for elites who dream to imitate the US model of development (a savage capitalism in an open frontier land) and which are not too much worried by the consequences of green-house effect on their own population. Here, it is important to notice that an international negotiation involves governments, constituted by the elites, and not common people. The position of a government may be quite different from its peoples’ interests if the political regime is rather independent from civil society.
Therefore, we have in fact two types of "Do-nothing positions": the one of the North (fighting greenhouse effect is too expensive and useless for us) and the one of the South (fighting greenhouse effect would unfairly hinder our development, and the results of global warming are irrelevant to us).
Nevertheless, our analysis above indicates two classes of potential followers of a precaution strategy. The first one includes the nations which have serious reasons to believe that they would be the first victims of global warming: Bangladesh, Maldives, India, Africa, and South America. When, moreover, they are countries which are both low producers of GHG (much less than the "sustainable" 500 kg/capita) and quite GHG-inefficient, they may assume that their contribution to world production may increase for a while without being a real problem. Similarly, Japan and E.U. are Northern countries which may think of decreasing their GHG-production. Producing less than 2 tons per capita and evolving towards a “service society with a steady population, they may think that the 500 kg target is within their scope. When, moreover, they are countries particularly sensitive to the dangers stemming from demographic and ecological turmoil at their southern borders, they may assume that a precaution strategy is relatively inexpensive and useful.
To conclude, above the effort was to show how the question of sustainable development has become a political issue based on the resources and culture of country or state. Therefore, it seems pertinent to ask if at all it is possible for us to attain the professed goal of sustainable development, or is it just a political myth to which all offers just a lip service. Any discussion on sustainable development, therefore, should take in to account the politics and cost of sustainable development prior to proposing measures of intervention.